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How well does the G20 reflect African interests and priorities? 
Some thoughts following the Los Cabos, Mexico summit 
The leaders of the G20 countries have now held 
seven summits - enough to begin critically 
evaluating how well the G20 serves the interest of 
specific sub-parts of the international community. 
The purpose of this policy brief is to assess how 
well the G20 responds to African interests. It is 
divided into three parts. The first is a brief 
description of the most recent summit, held on 
June 18-19, 2012 in Los Cabos, Mexico. The 
second part is a brief discussion of the criteria 
that will be used in this evaluation. The third part 
is an assessment of the G20 against these 
criteria. 
The Los Cabos summit 
The G20 summit is the culmination of a busy 
schedule of meetings of senior policy makers and 
technical experts. The participants in these 
meetings include, in addition to the 
representatives of the G20 states themselves, 
officials from international organizations such as 
the IMF, the World Bank, the regional 
development banks, the FSB, OECD, ILO, 
UNCTAD, WTO, and UNDP.  Representatives of 
regional organizations, such as the AU and 
NEPAD, are present at the summit. The purpose 
of these meetings is to follow up on the decisions 
and requests of the G20 leaders, promote 
cooperation between the participants of the G20 
process on particular issues, and to help shape 
the summit discussions and communiqué. 
So far, the host country for each year’s summit 
has served as the chair of the G20 during that 
year, even though the individual G20 working 
groups, panels and task forces will have their own 
chairs.  The host state is responsible for 
organizing and chairing the summit’s preparatory 
meetings and the summit itself. This allows the 
host country to influence both the G20’s agenda 
for that year and its future work programme. For 
example, Mexico as the 2012 host nation, 
focused attention on green growth and job 
creation. 
Since the G20 does not have a permanent 
secretariat, the participating international 
organizations usually assume responsibility for 
preparing the background studies and policy 
proposals for the leaders of the G20 and may 
play a role in implementing their decisions.  For 
example, the FSB and the IMF coordinate many 
of the studies on financial regulatory issues and 
the IMF serves as the leading independent 
assessor in the mutual assessment program that 
the G20 countries are implementing. These 
organizations also help transmit G20 initiatives, 
for example those relating to financial sector 
regulation, to the other states in the global 
system. 
The final point to note about the evolving G20 
process is the growing range of affiliated 
meetings held in conjunction with the G20 
process.  In the case of the Los Cabos summit, 
Mexico organized meetings of business leaders, 
labour, youth, think tanks, and civil society from 
the G20 countries. These meetings may result in 
reports which can feed into the G20 process.  
The results of Los Cabos 
The “Los Cabos Leadership Declaration”, the 
communiqué issued by the leaders at the end of 
the summit, makes clear that, although the 2012 
G20 summit was dominated by the Eurozone 
crisis, the leaders discussed other matters. 
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It is divided into the following sections: supporting 
economic stabilization and the global recovery; 
employment and social protection; trade; 
strengthening the international financial 
architecture; reforming the financial sector and 
fostering financial inclusion; enhancing food 
security and addressing commodity price 
volatility; meeting the challenges of development; 
promoting longer term prosperity through 
inclusive green growth; and intensifying the fight 
against corruption.  
In each section the leaders explain why they think 
the issue is important and they commit, or often 
recommit, themselves to certain objectives. 
However, they do not specify what actions they 
will take to reach these objectives.  They also 
request different actors, such as their ministers of 
finance or specific groups of international 
organizations, to undertake certain studies or 
prepare particular reports. 
The leaders also issued a “Los Cabos Growth 
and Jobs Action Plan” in which they promise to 
undertake a range of country and group specific 
measures to protect the integrity of the Eurozone, 
promote fiscal sustainability, price stability, and 
job creation. They also released a document 
containing the relevant policy commitments of 
each G20 member state. Most of the participating 
states, however, have previously committed 
themselves to these actions in earlier G20 
meetings and/or in domestic policy documents.  
At Los Cabos, the participants also re-asserted 
their determination to implement the 
“Accountability Assessment Framework”, which 
creates a process of peer review evaluations of 
each participating state’s implementation of the 
G20’s “strong, sustainable and balanced” growth 
framework. The first report on this mutual 
assessment process, in which the IMF assists, 
was issued at Los Cabos.  
One noteworthy action announced at the summit 
was that a group of countries, including all the 
BRICS countries, agreed to lend new funds to the 
IMF for use in future IMF operations, including in 
the Eurozone.  Many of these countries are 
hoping that their contributions will help accelerate 
IMF governance reform.  
The progress report of the G20 Development 
Working Group presented at Los Cabos is of 
particular interest to Africa. This report reaffirms 
the G20’s commitment to promoting such 
international objectives as the Millenium 
Development Goals and development 
effectiveness. In addition, the report discusses, in 
some detail, implementation of the Working 
Group’s priorities - infrastructure, food security 
and inclusive green growth. For example, the 
document stipulates in paragraph 14 that 
“incorporating social and environmental costs and 
benefits into economic decision making” is 
“critical” to inclusive green growth”. In regard, to 
infrastructure it states in paragraph 16 that its 
approach to infrastructure should seek 
“synergies” with inclusive green growth and  the 
Group’s development pillars - food security, 
human resource development, trade, private 
investment with job creation, growth with 
resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource 
mobilization, and knowledge sharing. It adds, in 
the same paragraph, that “adequately designed 
infrastructure investments offer opportunities for 
triple wins: economic growth, social inclusion and 
greater environmental sustainability”. In regard to 
food security, the report, in paragraph 27, 
highlights the importance of agricultural research 
and welcomes the work that is being done by 
other international bodies. It also encourages, in 
paragraph 31, all countries to support the 
“Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment” and the “Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forest in the Context of National Food Security”. 
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Criteria for evaluating the G20 
The criteria for evaluating how well the G20 
serves African interests needs to be based on an 
understanding of both the functions of the G20 
and of “African interests”. 
The functions of the G20 
The G20 performs three functions. First, it is a 
crisis manager.  In this capacity it is focused on 
forging agreement on the actions that the 
participants, individually and collectively, must 
take in order to try and resolve the crisis. 
Second, the G20 is an actor in global economic 
governance. It is the setting in which the major 
economies meet with the major international 
institutions - the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, 
the UN - to discuss the key economic challenges 
facing the international community. The G20, 
therefore, enables the relevant policy makers and 
technical experts from the participating countries 
and international organizations to meet and seek 
to develop common understandings and 
approaches on particular issues of global 
importance.  
Third, the G20 is a communicator. It helps to 
promote international global awareness of the 
challenges facing the global community and the 
approach that the most powerful countries are 
considering for dealing with these challenges.  
Defining “African interests” 
A continent with many diverse countries does not 
have one undifferentiated set of interests. 
Nevertheless, all sub-Saharan African countries 
do have some common concerns that can be 
considered to be “African interests” for this 
purpose. They all would benefit from economic 
policies and practices, at the global and national 
level, that are inclusive, in the sense that they 
allow all stakeholders, including the weakest 
nations, the poorest individuals, and the smallest 
companies to share in their benefits. They also 
share an interest in promoting balanced economic 
growth and development that is environmentally 
sustainable. Finally, all African nations seek 
effective global economic governance 
arrangements in which all stakeholders are able 
to participate. 
Given these functions, there are four tests that 
can be used to determine how well the G20 
responds to African interests: 
• How well does the G20 address the 
challenges created by the lack of 
inclusiveness - that is poverty, inequality, 
unemployment, and the inability of citizens 
to engage in national affairs? 
• How effectively does the G20 respond to 
the difficult environmental challenges that 
Africa is facing? 
• How effectively does the G20 support 
Africa’s ability to mobilize resources to 
finance its development?  
• Does the G20 promote global economic 
governance arrangements that allow for 
meaningful participation by all 
stakeholders, and that are transparent and 
accountable?  
Evaluating the G20 
Addressing inclusion 
At a rhetorical level the G20 can claim some 
success in making development more inclusive. 
The Los Cabos communiqués talks about the 
importance of inclusive green growth, job 
creation, social security and financial inclusion.  
However, the documents do not define what 
“inclusion” means for the G20 nor do they provide 
any guidance on the strategy for achieving it. This 
is particularly important given that there is no 
general consensus on how inclusion can be most 
effectively incorporated into the way in which 
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specific development policies are made and 
projects are selected, prepared, implemented, 
and operated.  
The G20 seems to address this issue indirectly 
through its institutional arrangements and work 
programme. For example, the creation of the 
Development Working Group, in part, is an effort 
to make sure that the concerns of developing 
countries are included in global economic 
governance. In addition, the G20 has created a 
group to work on financial inclusion and has 
asked the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision to study the impact of specific 
financial regulatory reforms on emerging markets 
and developing countries. It has also taken 
actions that are designed to reduce the volatility 
in commodity markets and to promote food 
security The G20 has also played a role in 
seeking to reform the governance structures of 
the multilateral development banks and the IMF 
and in ensuring that they have sufficient 
resources to fulfil their mandates, which, at least 
to some extent, deal with the challenge of 
exclusion at the level of the global economic 
system. These measures are all still in the 
process of being implemented and so it is too 
soon to judge their efficacy. 
Environmental challenges 
Africa is facing a number of important 
environmental challenges - for example, climate 
change, water shortages - that have the potential 
to constrain African efforts to deal with the 
problems of food security, infrastructure, 
urbanization, and job creation. The G20 does 
address these issues in its Los Cabos 
communiqué, where it discusses issues like 
green growth and food security.  In addition, the 
Development Working Group in its report 
emphasizes the importance of incorporating 
environmental considerations into economic 
decision making, and infrastructure project 
planning, construction, and operation. However, 
neither document evidences any attempt by the 
G20 to carefully consider how this should be 
done. There is no discussion in these documents 
on how to manage the complex trade-offs 
between maximizing economic benefits and 
mitigating the environmental and social costs that 
are likely to be required in regard to inclusive 
green growth, sustainable infrastructure, and 
environmental sensitive economic decision 
making. This is particularly troubling because 
there is clear evidence that these trade-offs exist, 
are complicated, capable of generating intense 
and sustained conflicts, and are seldom 
effectively resolved. 
Resource mobilization 
Africa needs additional resources to finance its 
economic development. While the G20 is not a 
fund-raising body, it does pay attention to this 
issue.  For example, it has expressed an interest 
in promoting more inclusive finance and one task 
assigned to its High Level Panel on Infrastructure 
was to identify innovative ways of financing 
infrastructure projects.  In addition, the 
Development Working Group includes domestic 
resource mobilization as one of its development 
“pillars”.  However, the G20 appears to view its 
function in this regard to be to highlight the issue 
rather to resolve it. Its documents provide very 
little information on how the G20 plans to address 
the challenges that developing countries, 
particularly African countries, face in mobilizing 
resources. It praises a number of existing 
initiatives but does not propose any new ones.  
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Global Economic Governance 
African countries are under-represented in the 
G20. Thus, they have a strong interest in G20 
undertaking efforts to promote greater 
participation in its process, and greater 
accountability to those affected by its decisions 
and actions.  To date, the G20 has not responded 
effectively to these interests.  
One reason for this is the composition of the G20. 
The participants in the G20 process are a self-
selected group of countries, together with those 
other inter-governmental and non-governmental 
participants that the members themselves choose 
to invite. These participants have no formal 
obligation to consult with other stakeholders 
about their agenda, work plan or decisions. The 
fact that the level of consultation is at the 
discretion of the various participants does not, 
however, mean that the participants do not 
consult with others. For example, South Africa 
does consult with other African countries through 
the C10, a grouping of African Ministers of 
Finance and central bank governors.  In addition, 
the amount of consultation undertaken by each 
summit chair will vary. For example, the Mexicans 
organized meetings with business leaders, labour 
leaders, think tanks and researchers, youth and 
civil society from G20 countries prior to Los 
Cabos. However, the invitees to these meetings 
attended in their personal capacities and without 
any mandate from broader groupings in their own 
countries.  These meetings were arranged at the 
discretion of the Mexicans and there is no 
guarantee that the Russians, the next G20 chair, 
will be as participatory in their approach. 
Moreover, there is no formal process through 
which interested stakeholders, who were not 
invited to these meetings, can submit information 
to these meetings or to the formal meetings in the 
G20 process.   
There is also no requirement that the G20 chair or 
other participants in G20 meetings report back to 
interested parties on the content of these 
meetings. The latter group are reduced to 
learning about the work of the G20 and the 
content of these meetings from the G20 
documents which are publicly available on its 
website, the content of which is determined by the 
G20 chair for that year. The media also play an 
important role in this regard. 
Finally, it is difficult for interested stakeholders to 
hold the G20 accountable.  While individual 
leaders and their governments may have to 
answer for their actions in the G20 through the 
electoral processes in each member country, 
there are no mechanisms through which 
interested persons can hold the G20 participants 
collectively or individually accountable for their 
failure to address particular issues, their approach 
to those issues that they do address, or for their 
failure to consult or to report back to their various 
stakeholders. One example of the problems that 
this can create is that the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, because it did not consult 
fully with all states and regulatory authorities that 
were not members of the Committee, failed to 
fully appreciate the impact of its imposed new 
capital adequacy standards on developing 
countries. As a result, the G20 has been forced to 
request a new study to review this matter.  
Conclusion 
The G20 has now been operating at a summit 
level for long enough that it is possible to begin 
critically assessing its performance. This paper is 
a first attempt to evaluate how responsive the 
G20 is to African interests. It identifies three 
functions that the G20 performs, and defines a 
set of African interests to which the G20 could be 
expected to respond. The paper then posits four 
tests for determining the responsiveness to 
African interests. It finds that the G20 does 
address African interests in its formal documents. 
However, this is often at a general level and 
without either making commitments to specific 
  
 
6 
The views expressed in news articles and research reports selected for inclusion in the various SAFPI news feeds do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA) or its sponsors. OSF-SA is also not responsible for any 
errors of fact contained in the articles articles. 
SAFPI Policy Brief No 6 
actions or providing the specific details that could 
assist African countries and their partners in 
formulating and implementing their own strategies 
for addressing these interests. This suggests that 
the G20 performs its awareness promoting 
function more effectively that its global economic 
governance function. It would also seem to be 
more effective at addressing the acute crises 
experienced by the Northern countries than the 
slower more endemic crises that afflict Africa. 
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